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In the quest for international soccer relevancy, MLS faces strong competition. 
Established European soccer leagues and strong domestic competition from the NFL, 
NBA, MLB, and NHL create steep barriers for league growth. To boost its 
international profile, MLS created the Designated Player (DP) Rule in 2007. This rule 
resulted in increased average salary and wage dispersion among the existing teams. 
This study examines the effects of these large wage changes on team performance. In 
the constructed model, the results of this increased wage dispersion remain 
inconclusive. Nonetheless, although the results from the average salary and team 
performance examination stand just outside the significance test cutoff, this model 
presents similar findings to previous literature in finding a substantial positive 
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This study contributes to existing research on the impact of Designated Players 
on Major League Soccer (MLS) salary equality and on-field production.  Major League 
soccer presents a unique opportunity to study this relationship due to the 2007 
implementation of the Designated Player Rule, also known as the Beckham Rule.  MLS 
implemented the Designated Player Rule to allow clubs to sign high-quality players 
primarily from overseas without exceeding the soft salary cap, which limits the amount 
of money teams can spend on players. This rule directly changed the dynamics of the 
salary system in MLS. Over the course of less than a decade, MLS’ system expanded 
from a $2M soft salary cap for all players in 2007 to several players making upwards of 
$1M a year in 2015 (Major League Soccer Players Union, 2015).  
Nonetheless, as the salary cap expanded, MLS paid these superstars monumental 
wages, creating wage inequality throughout MLS.  For example, in 2007, the first 
season of the Designated Player Rule, David Beckham received over $6.5M in 
guaranteed compensation while his teammate Kyle Varis earned just above $17,000.  
This extreme salary distribution creates interesting team dynamics on the field as some 
players are motivated to improve to earn the top wages and others feel injustice for 
receiving much lower wages for similar work. Therefore, this study compares the 
increasing wage inequality and on-field production as a result of the Beckham Rule. 
Moreover, this study expands the dialog concerning these vastly important 
players and renews some of the previous conclusions regarding wage inequality and 
team production, particularly with regards to Designated Players in Major League 





of these players to their respective MLS teams.  Thus this study presents viable research 
to help renew the dialog about the rule that changed the face of Major League Soccer. 
Background of the Beckham Rule Implementation 
Where Did Soccer Stand in the US at the Time? 
The 2006-2007 season marked MLS’ 11th season.  Over those seasons, MLS 
expanded dramatically, and planned to continue that trend with the introduction of 
Toronto FC the following season.  Despite this progress, however, MLS lacked 
profitability.  Like typical early-stage companies, such as Tesla Motors and Amazon, 
MLS operated at a loss in order to promote growth.  Perhaps more concerning than their 
financial troubles, however, MLS lacked credibility in the sports world. Despite strong 
growth in the first decade, MLS struggled to compete with other professional sports 
leagues both domestically and internationally. 
Domestic Competition 
In 2007, MLS stood firmly in the shadow of their domestic competitors: the 
National Football League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL).  MLS was smaller, 
and averaged lower attendance and revenues than their four main domestic competitors.   
The 2006 MLS featured 12 teams. In the same year, 32 teams competed in the 
NFL, while 30 competed in the NBA, NHL and MLB respectively. Furthermore, 
attendance for the 2006 MLS season was 15,404, their fourth highest total since the 





major domestic competitors, NBA (17,759), NHL (16,957), NFL (67,738), and MLB 
(31,404) (Plunkett, 2008).  
International Competition 
MLS’ competition in the market expands far beyond the United States.  In 2007, 
MLS struggled to not only attract fans away from these more established leagues, but 
they also had to divert these fans away from the superior leagues overseas.   These 
established leagues featured the highest quality players, stadiums, coaches, and most 
importantly skill.  For perspective, the 30 players who received the most votes for the 
2007 FIFA World Player of the Year each played in one of the five top leagues in 
Europe: the Premier League (England), La Liga (Spain), Serie A (Italy), Bundesliga 
(Germany) and Ligue 1 (France).   
To further illustrate the size of the gap between MLS and the top European 
leagues, 2006 marked the introduction of jersey sponsorship deals in MLS.  In a 
groundbreaking deal for between $500,000 and $1 million annually, Real Salt Lake 
announced a four-year sponsorship agreement with XanGo to place XanGo’s logo on 
the front of all RSL jerseys.  By this time, the jersey sponsorship practice was well-
established in Europe. In 2005, English club Manchester United announced a similar 
four-year deal with American International Group (AIG) for $106 million (Bell, 2016). 
This superior play overseas attracted many U.S. soccer fans.  Thus these fans 
faced the difficult decision of watching the lower quality domestic talent in MLS or 





Competitiveness Inside MLS 
Contrary to many of their international soccer competitors, one of Major League 
Soccer’s strengths was competitiveness within the league. Since MLS began in 1996, 10 
different teams have won the MLS Cup.  D.C. United won three of the first four, but 
Kansas City (Wizards and Sporting), San Jose Earthquakes, LA Galaxy, Houston 
Dynamo, Columbus Crew, Real Salt Lake, and the Portland Timbers have all won 
since.  For perspective, the English Premier League, which is widely considered to be 
one of the most competitive in the world, has featured five different winners since its 
inception in 1992.  
Major League Soccer Salary Structure in 2007 
One of the primary reasons for the strong competition within MLS is the league 
salary structure. MLS operates a single-entity structure in which the club operators own 
a stake in the league itself, not just their individual teams.  MLS’ structure is an 
anomaly in the sports world both domestically and internationally.  Unlike most other 
professional leagues where separate owners or investors own the teams, in MLS, the 
league itself owns the teams (Cotignola, 2015). For this reason, MLS retains a greater 
amount of control over its operations and teams than most other leagues.  Specifically, 
individual players sign their contracts through MLS, not the individual teams.  Thus, 
theoretically, MLS maintains the responsibility of negotiating salaries, recruiting 
players, compensating players using league funds, and maintains immense control over 
the employment of its players.   
More importantly, however, this single-entity salary structure, which featured a 





rules if necessary to recruit better players and boost the profile of the league (Keh, 
2010).  In 2007, Major League Soccer did just that through the implementation of the 
Designated Player Rule, better known as “The Beckham Rule.” 
Reason for the Designated Player Rule: 
Opportunity  
In the summer preceding the 2007 season, MLS faced a tough decision.  For the 
first time, the league had the opportunity to sign one of the biggest names in 
professional soccer, David Beckham.  In 2007, David Beckham captained the English 
National team, and played for one of the top teams in the world, Real Madrid C.F.  
Nobody questioned Beckham’s talent relative to the MLS.  Simply put, if the LA 
Galaxy pulled off this groundbreaking signing, Beckham would be one of the best, if 
not the best, players in the league.      
More importantly, however, Beckham presented a massive opportunity to boost 
the profile of the MLS as a whole.  Beckham was a phenomenal player, but his value to 
the league reached far beyond the field.  The combined celebrity of Beckham and his 
wife Victoria Beckham created huge buzz wherever they went. Signing Beckham would 
inevitably bring attention to the league across the world, while also proving that MLS 
could host top-quality players.  
Nonetheless, Beckham’s stardom far from guaranteed increased popularity of 
soccer in the U.S.  Unlike most countries in the rest of the world, in America the sport 
greatly struggled to attract fans. After all, the games greatest-ever player, Pelé, failed to 





American Soccer League, the league that preceded MLS.  Despite the popularity of the 
Brazilian and some other World Cup stars like Germany’s Franz Beckenbauer and 
Italy’s Giorgio Chinaglia, the NASL folded in 1985. Nonetheless, in a star-crazed 
market like Los Angeles, the arrival of Beckham presented huge possibilities of 
increased revenue and global attraction.  In Grant Wahl’s “The Beckham Experiment, ” 
the executive director of the USC Sports Business Institute, David Carter, describes the 
star-power of Beckham in Hollywood. He says, “Pelé is an athlete. Beckham and his 
wife and their whole aura is entertainment, of which sports is but one piece.” He 
continues, “In a celebrity-crazed era that we’re in, they roll into Southern California in a 
rather unique situation.  I don’t think you see that combination in sports very much. 
That’s what makes the Beckhams different. They’re coming to town ready, literally and 
figuratively, for prime time” (Wahl, 2009). Clearly, the Beckhams presented a huge 
marketing opportunity for MLS to boost the profile of the league. 
Dilemma 
For Major League Soccer in 2007, signing David Beckham presented an 
exciting but volatile decision.  To sign their man, MLS faced numerous obstacles.  First 
and foremost, the Beckham signing violated MLS’ salary cap restrictions.  Due in part 
to the failures of the North American Soccer League (NASL), MLS owners originally 
created the single-entity league system to minimize expenses while the league grew and 
waited for revenue to catch up.  MLS did not want to follow the lead of NASL, which 
disbanded in 1985 due in part to hurried league expansion and rapid player salary 
increases.  While the New York Cosmos of the NASL successfully paid superstars like 





Thus, prior to its inaugural season in 1996, MLS implemented the “soft” salary cap 
system similar to that of the NBA.  In order to promote fairness and maintain financial 
stability, this “soft cap” limits the amount teams can pay for players, while allowing 
some overages that incur a luxury tax from the league.  MLS distributes this luxury tax 
to smaller market teams to help promote financial fairness.   For a league operating at a 
deficit, this soft salary cap system helps prevent overspending.  For the LA Galaxy and 
MLS to sign Beckham, however, this salary cap system required adjustment.   
Beckham’s huge proposed wages pushed the LA Galaxy’s payroll well above this salary 
cap.   Thus MLS faced a tough decision: stick to their guns about minimizing costs and 
promoting fairness or change the salary cap rules to accommodate Beckham. 
Solution 
Ultimately, MLS decided the Beckham opportunity was too great to pass. So, 
after collective negotiation with the owners of the league, they settled on creating an 
adjustment to the soft salary cap system called the Designated Player Rule.  This rule 
later became more aptly known as “The Beckham Rule.” Under the Designated Player 
Rule, each MLS team allocated only the first $400,000 of the Designated Player’s 
salary towards the salary cap, which is paid off by the league, while the team owner 
accepted responsibility for the rest of the salary.  Furthermore, each team received one 
DP slot that they could use or trade as they desired.  To maintain fairness, however, 
MLS allowed a maximum of two DP slots per team.  
To put things into perspective, in 2007, the league salary cap floated right 
around $2M per year (Keh, 2010). At the time, only three players in the league received 





Donovan (LA Galaxy), Eddie Johnson (Kansas City), and Carlos Ruiz (FC Dallas) were 
“grandfathered” for one year, after which they would count towards the number of 
Designated Players (MLS Soccer Staff, 2010).  
In 2007, only three teams other than the LA Galaxy signed DPs to bring the total 
number of DPs to 5.  Thus, David Beckham, Cuauhtemoc Blanco (Chicago Fire), 
Denilson (FC Dallas), Juan Pablo Angel (New York Red Bulls) and Claudio Reyna 
(New York Red Bulls) paved a path for many other superstars to follow.   
Since the 2007 season, the Beckham rule evolved greatly.  The original DP rule 
expired after the 2009 season. Thus, MLS maintained the option to renew or discard the 
rule after reviewing its success after three seasons.  In 2010, MLS renewed the rule, but 
with several notable changes.  In 2012, the rule expanded again to include a provision 
for younger players.  The details of these rule changes are explained below: 
Designated Player Rule Details 
2007: The Original Designated Player Rule1 
• Each team has one DP slot that be can traded to attain a second 
• Maximum of two DPs per team 
• Landon Donovan, Eddie Johnson and Carlos Ruiz are grandfathered 
• $400,000 of the first designated player’s salary is allocated to the salary cap  
• $325,000 the second DP’s salary is allocated to the salary cap 
• Expires in 2009 
 
                                                        
1 Calvert, Wilson. "Designated Players Explained: How They Affect the Salary Cap and What Is the 





2010: Renewal and Expansion of the Rule 
• Two Designated Player slots per team with an option for a third.  These slots 
cannot be traded 
• Each team must pay a $250,000 luxury tax to acquire the third DP slot.  MLS 
distributes this luxury tax equally to all teams who have not purchased a third 
DP slot 
• $415,000 of each designated player’s salary is allocated to the salary cap  
• $325,000 of the second DP’s salary is allocated to the salary cap 
• Landon Donovan is no longer grandfathered and is considered a DP 
• No expiration date on the rule 
 
2012: Rule changes involving younger players 
• $335,000 of each designated player’s salary for players over the age of 23 is 
allocated to the salary cap  
• For players 21-23 years old this amount decreases to $200,000 
• For players under 21 years old this amount decreases to $150,000 
• Clubs do not have to purchase a third DP spot for players 23 and younger 
*Maximum budget charges for players over 23 years old increased each year after 2012. 
These charges increased to $368,750 for 2013, $387,500 in 2014, and $436,250 in 2015 







Table 1: Designated Player Rule Changes Summary   
Year Salary 
Cap 
DP Slot 1 DP Slot 2 DP Slot 3 
2007 $2.1 M $400,000 $335,000 NA 
2008 $2.3 M $400,000 $335,000 NA 
2009 $2.3 M $415,000 $335,000 NA 
2010 $2.6 M $335,000 $335,000 $335,000+$250,000 tax 
2011 $2.7 M $335,000 $335,000 $335,000+$250,000 tax 
2012 $2.8 M $350,000 $350,000 $335,000+$250,000 tax 
2013 $2.9 M $368,750 $368,750 $368,750+$250,000 tax 
2014 $3.1 M $387,500 $387,500 $387,500+$250,000 tax 
2015 $3.5 M $436,250 $436,250 $436,250+$250,000 tax 
 
*Starting in 2012, DPs age 20 or younger count as a $150,000 charge against the team’s 
salary budget.  DPs age 21-23 count as $200,000 against the budget. **If a DP joins  
midseason the budget charge is halved 
Salary Inequality 
The Beckham Rule provided a loophole for MLS to attract and pay for top 
quality talent that largely only existed overseas until 2007. MLS teams were willing to 
pay huge wages to the top players because they believed they could attract the fans and 
help their teams on the field.  Nonetheless, these new huge salaries brought about by the 
rule change also directly increased the salary inequality among players in the league.   
For example, Orlando SC Designated Player Kaka earned 62% of the team’s 
total payroll in 2015. Furthermore, the top player for 7 out of 20 teams earned at least 
25% of their team’s total payroll in 2015 (McMahon, 2015). Furthermore, Additional 
Figures 1 and 2 graphically illustrate the dispersion of team wages by player in 2015 
and 2014.  One glance at each of these figures, found at the end of this study, illustrates 
the sheer magnitude of wage inequality that still exists among MLS teams.  
In theory, one might think that higher quality talent would directly increase 





improve the goal differentials of their teams, and ultimately lead to more wins per 
season.  Nonetheless, these assumptions do not always hold true.  In 2009, when 
discussing the on-field success of Designated Players, DC United’s team president 
Kevin Payne said, “Everybody is naïve because everybody has expectations that are 
unrealistic.  You might say that if you pay a player that much money, you expect 
results. It doesn’t always work out that way” (Bell, 2009). Clearly, just a few years after 
the inception of the rule, Kevin Payne understood that high pay doesn’t always mean 
great success.  No clear-cut formula exists to achieve success in MLS, but the Beckham 
Rule certainly opened the door for teams trying to buy superstars to lead their teams to 
victory.  Thus this study directly asks and investigates questions involving the effect of 








Wage Dispersion Theories 
Existing research involving wage dispersion and team performance revolves 
around a few key theories.  In theory of tournaments, Lazear and Rosen (1981) point to 
situations where wage is determined based on rank within the firm as incentive for 
employees to boost productivity.  In these situations, they see increased wage dispersion 
as positively related to employee effort and productivity.  Similarly, Bloom’s 
hierarchical pay system (1999) positively relates pay dispersion to team performance. 
This hierarchical pay system incentivizes production by paying high-talent workers 
higher salaries, thus motivating low-wage workers to boost performance to obtain 
increased salaries. 
Contrastingly, Akerlof and Yellen’s wage compression hypothesis (1990) 
predicts an inverse relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity. They 
conclude the dissatisfaction of low-wage workers due to the heavy wage dispersion 
negatively affects the production of the firm.  Furthermore, Levine’s Cohesion Theory 
(1991) implies that increasing wage equality boosts firm productivity due to the 
increased employee satisfaction and unity, which arises from equal wages.   
Relevant Research  
Today, a large body of research exists discussing wage dispersion and 
organizational productivity.  Nonetheless, this research remains divided in concluding 
whether this relationship is negative, positive, or null.  Some of the primary arguments 






Existing research comparing these contrasting hypothesis largely points to an 
inverse relationship between wage dispersion and organizational productivity.  For 
example, Depken’s study of wage dispersion in Major League Baseball (2000), which 
uses data from 1985 to 1998, supports cohesion theory.  Depken’s evidence shows that 
increased average salary for a team increases team performance, while increased salary 
dispersion reduces team performance. Pfeffer and Langton’s study of faculty from 
various colleges and universities (1993) reports a similar negative relationship.  Their 
research suggests that increasing wage dispersion reduces research productivity, 
research satisfaction, and finally willingness to collaborate on research.   
 Positive Relationship 
Contrary to the findings above, a smaller sample of existing research concludes 
a positive relationship between wage dispersion and productivity.  For example, 
Shouten’s 2012 study of the ideal amount of dispersion to maximize wins in an NBA 
season finds a significant positive relationship.  Furthermore, Berri and Simmons’ 2011 
investigation of wage inequality and team performance in the NBA from 1990-2008 
advances tournament theory.  Ultimately, their research concludes that expected pay 
inequality positively affects team and individual performance and shows no significant 
relationship between conditional dispersion and individual or team performance.   
 Null Relationship 
Nonetheless, results from these studies remain largely inconclusive.  For 





dispersion statistically indeterminate of team productivity. They cite the quality of 
players and quality of coaches as the only relevant factors in determining team success.  
Katayama and Nuch’s 2011 study uses information from five NBA seasons from 2002-
2006 and three different measurements of salary dispersion.  Their research ultimately 
demonstrates no causal relationship between salary dispersion on team performance 
regardless of the way they measure salary dispersion. 
 Soccer-Specific Data 
The data relating to Major League Soccer primarily declares a negative 
relationship between wage inequality and team productivity.  Coates, Frick and Jewell’s 
results from their 2012 study support Levine’s cohesion theory.  They conclude the 
existence of a negative relationship between salary dispersion and on-field performance 
in Major League Soccer from 2005-2012.  Other similar studies of MLS feature similar 
results (Sonntag and Sommers, 2014; Breunig, Garrett-Rumba, Jardin, and Rocaboy, 
2014; Hobbs, 2015).  
Nonetheless, Franck and Nuesch (2011) found a U-shaped relationship between 
wage dispersion and performance in their study of German soccer from the 1995-96 to 
2006-07 seasons.  They found that the teams with the largest wage dispersion and most 
egalitarian systems achieved higher on-field success than those with medium wage 
dispersion. 
Contrastingly, Bucciol, Foss and Piovesan’s study of professional Italian soccer 
(2014) presents evidence involving pay dispersion and team production that is both 
mixed and inconclusive. For example, in the same data set, they see negative, null, and 





define team.  Ultimately, they find that no significant relationship between pay 
dispersion and performance exists.  
Average Wage Studies 
Despite the different conclusions of the relationship between wage inequality 
and dispersion of Franck and Nuesch, Sonntag and Sommers, and Hobbs, each of these 
soccer-related studies concludes that increasing average salary positively relates to on-
field success.  Similarly, Depken’s study of MLB finds a positive relationship between 
average salary and on-field production.  Thus, existing research largely confirms a 







To ultimately fulfill the goal of adding to the existing dialogue regarding the 
impact of Designated Players on team performance in Major League Soccer, I crafted a 
set of hypotheses to examine.  These hypotheses are based on the findings of the large 
existing body of research.  
Hypotheses #1-6 are derived from existing literature examining the effects of 
wage dispersion and average wage increases on team performance.  Based on Levine’s 
cohesion theory (1991) and Akerlof and Yellen’s wage compression hypothesis (1990), 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that increased standard deviation in salary leads to decreased on 
field production (measured in PPG). 
I expect that the negative externalities from increased wage inequality 
summarized by these two theories will decrease on-field productivity.  Furthermore, I 
predict that my results will align with similar studies such as Coates, Jewell, and Frick 
(2012), Sonntag and Sommers (2014), and Hobbs (2015), which found a negative 
relationship between wage dispersion and team production. 
Nonetheless, many of the findings in existing studies are tempered by a positive 
relationship between average team salary and organizational productivity.  Coates, Frick 
and Jewell (2012), Sonntag and Sommers (2014), Hobbs (2015), and Depken (2000) 
express these findings in their research of MLS and MLB respectively.  Based upon 
these findings, I expect teams with more DPs to have higher average salaries because 
DPs by nature typically receive the lion’s share of team salary.  Due to this previous 
literature, Hypothesis 2 states that increased average team salary results in increased on-





 Furthermore, due to this positive relationship between salary and productivity, I 
anticipate that teams who invest heavily in DPs will score more goals. Thus Hypothesis 
3 states: teams with more DPs score more goals than those who have fewer DPs.  
Similarly, Hypothesis 4 predicts teams with more DPs will allow fewer goals and 
Hypothesis 5 combines Hypothesis 3 and 4 and states that teams with more DPs have a 
greater goal differential.  Futhermore, Hypothesis 6 states: teams with more DPs 
average more points per game than those who have fewer or no DPs. 
Hypotheses 7-8 examine questions that both fulfill my curiosity and contribute 
to the existing narrative regarding the impact of the Designated Player on MLS.  These 
hypotheses do not clearly fit with the existing research regarding wage dispersion and 
team performance, but I utilize other existing literature to form my expectations.   
For example, Humphrey, Morgeson, and Mannor (2009) argue that high levels 
of experience and job-related skill are crucial for predicting firm performance.  
Nonetheless, they conclude that these same traits are significantly more important when 
they are characteristics of core-role holders on the team.  Thus, Hypothesis 7 predicts 
that non-DP skill level will be more important in the presence of DPs.  The rationale 
behind this hypothesis is derived from the DPs typical placement as core-role holders 
on the team (striker, central midfielder, central defender, goalkeeper, etc.).  Finally, 
based on these studies, Hypothesis 8 states that the interactive effect of DP skill and 






To examine these hypotheses, I began by researching the changing payrolls of 
Major League Soccer teams from 2007-2015.  MLS first introduced the DP Rule in 
2007, thus I used the 2007-2008 season as the starting point for my research.  Every 
year, MLSPU releases a list showing the base salary and guaranteed compensation for 
all players club by club.  By using this data, I analyzed club salaries across a several 
year period with consistent data from a reliable source. Using the annual salary 
information published by the MLS Players’ Union, I measured wages of each club from 
2007-2015 by calculating the average, variance and standard deviation of player 
salaries.  
After conducting this initial team salary research, I turned to find an adequate 
measurement of team success each season.  Using the information from MLS.com I 
manually entered team statistics for all regular season games.  I chose to use points-per-
game (PPG), the goals for (GF), goals against (GA), and goal differential (GD) statistics 
as my primary indicators of team performance.  Note: points-per-game indicates the 
average points gained from wins, losses, and ties over the course of the season. In MLS, 
the winning team receives 3 points, the losing team receives 0, and each team collects 1 
point in the event of a tie. 
After much debate, I decided against using postseason information for my 
analysis.  Several factors contributed to this decision. First, I feared that postseason data 
could cloud some of the data used for analysis such as goals for, goals against, games 





the universality of my findings could be affected.  Thus by using only regular season 
data, the on-field production was measured fairly and uniformly.  
Following the addition of in-game statistics for each team, my focus again 
turned towards identifying and separating the Designated Players from the rest of the 
data pool.  To do so, I identified each teams’ DPs season by season, and recalculated the 
average, standard deviation, and variance of these player’s salaries and ran additional 
calculations excluding these high wage earners. 
After combining this wage information with the regular season statistics of each 
team, I used IBM’s SPSS software to test my hypotheses and analyze the data. This 
program allowed me to examine correlations, direct and moderating effects, and find p-
values to potentially reject or support my hypotheses. 
In each of these tests, my null hypothesis states that the independent variables I 
examine will have no effect on the dependent variable.  On the other hand, I use the p-
value technique to explain how well the data supports the null hypothesis that there is 
no effect.  High p-values indicate that the null hypothesis is likely true.  Low p-values, 
defined as a p-value less than .05 indicate that the data fails to support the null 
hypothesis.  Therefore, if my results illustrate a p-value less than .05, then there is 






Note: Due to rapid league expansion, the number of games played increased as 
new teams entered the league. The league additions are listed below: 
Table 2: Timeline of Inaugural Season for MLS Expansion Teams  
Inaugural Season MLS Team 
2007 Toronto FC 
2009 Seattle Sounders SC 
2010 Philadelphia Union 
2011 Vancouver Whitecaps FC & Portland Timbers 
2012 Montreal Impact 







Figure 1: Correlation Table for Key Variables 
Note: ** p < .01.  * p < .05 
This figure demonstrates the correlations of the key variables of the study.  Some of the 
key variables to focus attention are the team average salary and team standard deviation 
with and without Designated Players (AVG, STDEV, AVG-NoDP, and STDEV-NoDP 
respectively).  Furthermore, this figure contains the number of Designated Players (DP) 
organized by positions of goalkeeper (GK), defense (DEF), midfield (MID) and 
forward (FWD) as well as key in-game statistics including points per game (PPG) and 
goal differential (GD).   
Table 3: Hypothesis 1 Results 
Hyp. Dep. Variable Ind. Variable P-value B Conclusion 
1 PPG STDEV .95 7.195E-8 Fail to reject 
 
The results of the Hypothesis 1 test of the relationship between wage dispersion 
and on-field production failed to reject the null hypothesis.  The unstandardized 
regression coefficient B of STDEV was 7.195E-8 while the significance level of .95 





failed to conclude the hypothesis indicating a negative relationship between standard 
deviation of wages (pay dispersion) and on-field production.   
Table 4: Hypothesis 2 Results 
Hyp. Dep. Variable Ind. Variable P-value B Conclusion 
2 Points Per Game Avg Salary .029 3.609E-7 Reject 
 
The results for Hypothesis 2 showed significance.  The p-value of .029 ≤ 0.05 
provides enough evidence to reject the null.  This p-value and the unstandardized 
coefficient of 3.609E-7 suggest that the team average salary (AVG) has a strong effect 
on PPG.  Thus these results match the findings of previous studies, which describe a 
positive relationship between team average salary and team performance. 
Table 5: Hypothesis 3 Results 
Hyp. Dep. Variable Ind. Variable P-value B Conclusion 
3 Goals For DEF .008 6.34 Reject 
3 Goals For MID .294 .580 Fail to Reject 
3 Goals For FWD .008 2.62 Reject 
 
Furthermore, the results of the one-tailed Hypothesis 3 test showed a strong 
significance between Goals For (GF) and the number DPs playing forward (FWD) and 
defense (DEF).  Interestingly, the number of midfielders (MID) was not significant in 
predicting GF.  The p values of .008 and .008 for DEF and FWD respectively was less 
than the .05 cutoff, while the p-value for MID was .294.  Based on the unstandardized 
regression coefficient B, DEF contributed 6.34 goals and FWDs contributed and 







Table 6: Hypothesis 4 Results 
Hyp. Dep. Variable Ind. Variable P-value B Conclusion 
3 Goals Against DEF .313 -1.290 Fail to Reject 
3 Goals Against MID .007 2.714 Reject 
3 Goals Against FWD .024 2.188 Reject 
 
Interestingly, one-sided results from Question 4 directly contradicted the null 
hypothesis.  MID and FWD DPs were significant in predicting Goals Against (GA) 
based on their p-values of .007 and .024 respectively.  Their unstandardized coefficients 
B of 2.714 and 2.188 indicate that each additional MID and FWD DP resulted in an 
average of 2.7 and 2.2 more goals per season.  With a p-value of .313, DEF DPs 
surprisingly failed to reject the null hypothesis and significantly impact the number of 
GA per season. 
Table 7: Hypothesis 5 Results 
Hyp. Dep. Variable Ind. Variable P-value B Conclusion 
4 Goal Differential DEF .03 7.556 Reject 
4 Goal Differential MID .0965 -2.123 Fail to Reject 
4 Goal Differential FWD .398 .426 Fail to Reject 
 
Nonetheless, in the results of Hypothesis 5, DEF showed a p-value of .03 in 
predicting Goal Differential (GD).  This p-value provides enough evidence to reject the 
null and demonstrates a significant positive relationship between the number of 
defensive DPs and GD.  Furthermore with a Std. Error of 3.983, the results suggest that 
defensive DPs contribute substantially to team performance measured in GD.  On the 
other hand, MIDs and FWDs failed to reject the null hypothesis though the p-value of 







Table 8: Hypothesis 6 Results 
Hyp. Dep. Variable Ind. Variable P-value B Conclusion 
6 PPG DPs .246 .016 Fail to Reject 
 
Based on the p-value of .246, the results from the one-sided Hypothesis 7 fail to 
reject the null hypothesis.  The results do not indicate a substantial positive relationship 
between the number of DPs and PPG. 
Table 9: Hypothesis 7 Results 
Hyp. Dep. Variable Ind. Variable P-value B Conclusion 
7 PPG NDPAvgxDPyes_no .369 2.250E-6 Fail to Reject 
 
The results from Question 7 do not support the alternative hypothesis that Non-
DP skill level is more important in the presence of DPs. With a p-value of .369 and 
unstandardized coefficient of 2.250E-6, the results of this interaction failed to reject the 
null.  Nonetheless, the effect trends towards DPs having an interactive effect with Non-
DPs in positively affecting performance as measured by PPG.   
Table 10: Hypothesis 8 Results 
Hyp. Dep. Variable Ind. Variable P-value B Conclusion 
8 PPG DPAvgxNDPAvg .584 -2.129E-13 Fail to Reject 
 
Furthermore, the results of Hypothesis 8 proved unsubstantial to reject the null 
hypothesis.  The p-value of .584 failed to provide evidence that the relationship of DP 








Summary of findings: 
 The results of this study largely failed to reject my null hypothesis.  First, based 
on the results of this study, the standard deviation of wages fails to significantly affect 
team PPG.  This result interestingly contradicts much of the existing literature that 
details a negative relationship between wage dispersion and team performance (Depken, 
2000; Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Coates, Frick, and Jewell 2012).  Nonetheless, this 
existing literature remains far from one-dimensional with many other studies indicating 
contrasting positive relationships (Shouten, 2012; Simmons and Berri, 2011) or 
reporting similar findings to this study of no significant relationship whatsoever 
(Katayama and Nuch, 2011; Berri and Jewell, 2004).  
 On the other hand, some of the results of this study confirmed expectations 
based on previous literature.  For example, similar to Depken (2000) and Hobbs (2015), 
the results show increased wages in MLS does contribute to on-field success.  Though 
the p-value of .029, the results from Hypothesis 2 provide evidence to reject the null 
and indicate a significant positive relationship between average pay and team 
performance as measured through PPG.   
Theoretical Implications: 
 From a theoretical standpoint, this study fails to conclude a negative or positive 
relationship between wage dispersion as described by compression theory, cohesion 
theory, tournament theory, or the hierarchal pay system.  These inconclusive findings 





employee dissatisfaction resulting from wage inequality and internal motivation of low-
wage employees to achieve the massive salaries of some of the Designated Players.   
Furthermore, due to results that largely failed to reject the null hypothesis, it 
remains possible that overestimation of the importance of Designated Players occurred.  
These highly demanded, highly paid international superstars largely fail to have the 
dominating impact on PPG predicted prior to the tests. Nonetheless, these big-name 
players confirm expectations on a few fronts.  For example, the results suggest that 
Defensive DPs substantially positively affect goal differential.  Furthermore, DPs 
playing defense and forward demonstrate significance in predicting goals for.  Finally, 
DPs playing in midfield and forward significantly related to an increase in goals scored 
against their teams.  Thus though DPs failed to significantly impact the bottom line 
measurement of points per game for their teams, they clearly made impacts in different 
statistical categories.   
Management Implications: 
 From a managerial perspective, this study suggests that increasing the team 
average salary will increase on-field production.  Nonetheless, the evidence involving 
the most successful amount of wage dispersion remains inconclusive.  Furthermore, the 
results offer little evidence of an interactive effect causing Non-DPs to improve 
performance in the presence of DPs.  Nonetheless, the positive relationship between 
defenders and forwards on goals for, and the impact of defensive players on goal 
differential offers some evidence to promote the spread of key players across numerous 
positions.   





 Since the implementation of the Designated Player Rule, MLS has achieved 
impressive growth.  League attendance figures, team values, and new player signings 
illustrate this growth and offer perspective on the current state of MLS in the new 
Designated Player era.     
Attendance 
MLS ranks seventh in attendance among other major soccer leagues in the world 
and third among major professional sports leagues in the US (MakeEverdayGameday). 
Nonetheless, over the past two years, average attendance in MLS rose from 18,600 fans 
to 21,100 per game.  These figures push MLS well beyond the NBA’s 17,800 fans per 
game and NHL’s 17,500 (Statista).  Thus, while MLS remains fifth in revenue among 
professional sports leagues in the U.S., they place third in attendance trailing MLB and 






Figure 2: MLS Attendance Growth 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates the growth of MLS since the inaugural season in average 
attendance and total attendance.  This figure shows clear growth and offers projections 
for upcoming seasons  (Gaines, 2014). 
 Team Values 
 Furthermore, since 1996 the team values for MLS have increased.  At the 
moment, three MLS teams are valued at $200 million or greater.  While the MLS team 
valuations remain dramatically lower than the top three football teams in the world, 
which each feature valuations greater than $3 billion, they show the current standing of 
MLS teams relative to the top clubs in the world.  Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the values of 







Table 11: MLS Team Values 
MLS 
Rank 
MLS Team Value 
1 Seattle Sounders $245 Million 
2 LA Galaxy $240 Million 
3 Houston Dynamo $200 Million 
Table 11 illustrates the team values of the 3 highest valued teams in MLS (Smith, 2016) 




Table 12 illustrates the values for the world football clubs with the highest value 
(Smith, 2016) 
 Sebastian Giovinco’s Success 
While the MLS attendance and team values figures offer strong perspective on 
the growth and current of MLS, perhaps the greatest example of MLS’ newfound 
strength internationally is Sebastian Giovinco.  Toronto FC’s signing of Giovinco 
evidences the type of player that was impossible to sign prior to the Designated Player 
Rule.  Giovinco left Italian giant Juventus to join MLS in 2015.  In his first season with 
Toronto, Giovinco immediately displayed his talent.  He broke MLS’ points record for 
the combination of goals and assists scored in a season.  After recording 22 goals and 
16 assists in 33 appearances, Giovinco won MLS Golden Boot, Newcomer of the Year, 
and earned the MLS MVP award (MLS Soccer Staff, 2016).  
While Giovinco’s MLS success surprised no one who saw his skill when he 
played for Juventus and the Italian national team, his story is unique to MLS.  Unlike 
World 
Rank 
Club (Country) Value 
1 Real Madrid (Spain) $3,263 Million 
2 Barcelona (Spain) $3,163 Million 
3 Manchester United (England) $3,104 Million 





many of the aging international DPs MLS signed since 2007, Giovinco left to play in 
MLS at arguably the prime of his career, age 27.  He left Juventus at the point in his 
career where his services were in high demand and he could have forged success at a 
number of the top clubs in Europe.  Despite Giovinco’s strong alternatives abroad, he 
ultimately decided to pursue a career in North America (Clough, 2016).  Giovinco’s 
unprecedented success and mid-career move marks MLS’ new ability to compete for 
top talent and the type of signing MLS hopes to replicate moving forward.   
Limitations/Suggestions for future research:  
This study analyzes team success at a basic level by comparing and separating 
DPs and Non-DPs into different categories.  Nonetheless, not all of these DPs and Non-
DPs have the same impact and should not be treated as such.  Finding adequate player-
by-player statistics was one of the limitations of this study. Nonetheless, with additional 
statistics and more readily available information, future researchers should separate 
contributing Non-DPs from Non-DPs who are simply roster players or by moderating 
results based on the actual time spent on the field.  Furthermore, DPs do not play every 
game, so a game-by-game analysis could add depth to future studies.  Finally, this study 
uses information from the regular season only, so the addition of postseason success 
measures could provide an interesting wrinkle to the team performance conversation.   
Moreover, this study employs one vital assumption when examining the 
hypotheses.  Due to the inability to acquire robust player-by-player statistics to measure 
skill level of DPs and Non-DPs, this study employs pay as a proxy for skill.  The 
rationale behind this assumption is simple: in many professional sports leagues, the 





Similarly, low-skill players typically garner small contracts.  Traditionally, teams and 
players negotiate contracts based on the player’s skill relative to others who play the 
same position.  Thus, this study assumes that the compensation for DPs and Non-DPs 
within MLS reflects skill level.  Nonetheless, this assumption poses the greatest 
limitation to this research because of the numerous cases where pay fails to reflect skill.  
For example, highly skilled players sometimes fail to receive top wages due to their 
position or age.  Similarly, MLS owners might pay average-quality DPs top-quality 
salaries because of the impact such a signing can have on team attendance and revenue.  
Finally, in the event of a serious injury to a highly paid player, a low-skill player may 
play more significant minutes. Thus this study calls for more accurate measures of 
individual skill level than the rough proxy of pay in future research.   
On a slightly different note, due to the advanced age of some of these big-name 
DP signings when they come to the MLS, their main impact on MLS may not be on the 
field.  Rather, these big-name older players, which include Beckham, Gerrard, Kaka, 
and Lampard, may have a larger impact on the bottom line of their respective clubs.  
Thus this study calls for additional research regarding the financial impact of these 
players on revenue through increased attendance, TV viewership, merchandise sales, 
and more.   Furthermore, future research could focus on the unanswered questions 
regarding the true impact of Designated Players on league attendance and team 
valuations.    
Finally, the use of points per game (PPG) as the bottom line measurement for 
team success may not fit the statistical goals of the study.  In other sports, team success 





offensive success through points for or defensive success through points against.  These 
numbers can consistently hit triple digits and the NBA plays 82 games per season.   
Nonetheless, in professional soccer, where these numbers are much smaller and teams 
play fewer games in a season, measurements of success can be more difficult to 
calculate.  For example, a shot bouncing out off the crossbar late in the game can be the 
difference between three points and one point recording in the overall standings.  Thus, 
the use of points per game as the underlying statistic to measure team performance in 
professional soccer does not always reflect the team success on the field.  Future 
research can account for this problem by employing a greater array of data that includes 
statistics such as time of possession, number of shots, number of shots on goal, 
percentage of passes completed, etc.   
Supplemental Analysis: 
Due to the issues involving the use of PPG as a measure of team performance 
described above I performed a supplemental analysis to provide more granular data.  
This analysis investigates alternative measures of team success, such as goals for, goals 
against, goal differential, wins, and losses to better understand the earlier questions. 









Wins Standard deviation of 
team wages 
9.607E-7 .182 
Goal For Standard deviation of 
team wages 
5.416E-6 .001 
Goal Differential Standard deviation of 
team wages 
3.082E-6 .190 
Goals Against Standard deviation of 
team wages 
2.307E-6 .147 








First and foremost, the relationship between increased wage dispersion 
(STDEV) and team performance (originally measured in PPG) requires additional 
measurements.  After running several regressions with results shown in Table 13, the 
results indicate a clear positive relationship between wage dispersion and goals for.  
Interestingly, the p-values suggested by the goal differential, win, and goals against 
regressions trend towards significance, but rest above the .05 p-value threshold.  The 
relationship between losses and wage dispersion fails to demonstrate significance. 
 









Points Per Game Non-DP average skill 
& whether or not 
team has DPs  
2.250E-6 .369 
Goals For Non-DP average skill 
& whether or not 
team has DPs 
4.78E-5 .492 
Goals Against Non-DP average skill 
& whether or not 
team has DPs 
-.7641E-5 .275 
Goal Differential Non-DP average skill 
& whether or not 
team has DPs 
.000 .248 
 
Moreover, the additional regressions involving Question 7 and the relation 
between DPs affecting the performance of Non-DPs fail to support the hypothesis 
regardless of the measurement of performance.  Though the p-values of each of these 


















Points Per Game Interactive effect between 
DP average skill & Non-DP 
average skill 
-2.129E-13 .584 
Goals For Interactive effect between 
DP average skill & Non-DP 
average skill 
-6.581E-12 .544 
Goals Against Interactive effect between 
DP average skill & Non-DP 
average skill 
-6.377E-12 .565 
Goal Differential Interactive effect between 




Finally, the additional regressions for Question 8, which investigates the 
moderation of DP performance by Non-DP skill level, fails to reject the null.  The high 
p-values for each of these regressions demonstrate little evidence of the significance of 
Non-DPs as moderators for the relationship between DPs and performance.  
Conclusion: 
The study investigated the relationship between increased salary dispersion, 
increased average salary, and team performance as a direct result of MLS’ 2007 
implementation of the Designated Player Rule.  The results concluded no significant 
relationship between increased standard deviation and team performance. These results 
failed to support the wage compression hypothesis or cohesion theory, which suggest a 
negative relationship.  Similarly, they failed to support the hierarchical pay system or 





highly divided existing body of research as another study that indicates no significant 
relationship between the two. 
Moreover, the results of the average team salary and performance relationship 
matched expectations based on prior research.  The one-sided p-value provides evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis and indicates a positive relationship between average salary 
and performance.   
Furthermore, this study examined the possibility of an interactive effect between 
DPs and Non-DPs impacting team performance.  While the results of this investigation 
failed to reject the null hypothesis, these results create an interesting possibility for 
future exploration.  Utilization of more precise statistical data such as the number of 
minutes played for DPs and Non-DPs could present evidence of such an interaction.    
From a managerial perspective, the results of this study imply that on-field 
success can be improved by increasing the average salary of the team.  Furthermore, the 
results of the wage dispersion-team performance tests suggest that spreading a few top 
quality players across different positions can have a substantial effect on goals for, goals 
against, and goal differential.  Nonetheless, from a business standpoint, signing a few-
high quality rather than several average players could substantially affect team 
revenues. Simple conjecture suggests that signing superstars attracts fans and boosts 








Figure 3: 2015 Distribution of Player Salaries 
 
This figure demonstrates the cumulative salaries of the various clubs for the 2015 
season. Each of the blocks illustrates the proportionate size of the salary of one player 








Figure 4: 2014 Distribution of Player Salaries 
 
This figure demonstrates the cumulative salaries of the various clubs for the 2014 
season. Each of the blocks illustrates the proportionate size of the salary of one player 
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